Three Questions, Asked Before the Wire Goes Out
The FBI says scammers now target seniors specifically while they're closing on a home sale, because a wire that size doesn't look out of place. A community bank's fraud chief says the fix starts with three questions asked at the counter.
A wire transfer for a house closing is supposed to look big. That's exactly why the FBI says it's become a favorite moment for fraud.
The bureau's Internet Crime Complaint Center flags business email compromise schemes that specifically "frequently target seniors closing on home sales," intercepting or spoofing the real-estate or title-company emails a seller is already expecting, then redirecting the wire to an account the scammer controls. Nothing about the transaction looks unusual to a bank processing it. The dollar amount is supposed to be large. The paperwork looks right. The only thing wrong is where the money is actually headed.
The number behind why banks are training for this now
According to the FBI's most recent Internet Crime Report, Americans age 60 and older lost $7.75 billion to cybercrime in 2025 — up 59 percent from the year before — across more than 201,000 complaints, with over 12,400 victims individually losing more than $100,000. Investment fraud, much of it fake cryptocurrency platforms, topped the list at $3.52 billion. Tech-support scams took $1.04 billion. Romance scams took $584 million. Business email compromise — the category that catches home-sale wires — accounted for $568 million across 4,566 complaints.
The average loss per senior victim: $38,500.
What a bank actually does about it
ABA's fraud-and-cybersecurity team runs a recurring segment called Fraudcast, hosted by Paul Benda, the association's EVP for risk, fraud and cybersecurity. A recent episode featured Margi Fleming, senior vice president and chief administrative officer at The Citizens Bank in Florence, South Carolina, describing what her front-line staff are trained to do before an unusual wire goes out.
Her read on why this works the way it does: "Scammers are spectacular at telling the story and making our customers believe it."
Wire fraud is a different animal from a forged check. Nobody signs anyone else's name. The account holder authorizes the transfer themselves, in real time, because they believe they're paying a real bill, closing a real sale, or helping a relative in real trouble. That's exactly what makes it hard to reverse afterward — the bank sent the money exactly where its own customer told it to.
Which is why the intervention has to happen before the wire goes out, not after. Per the training Fleming described, staff are taught to ask, in some form, three things: Have you been coached to take this action? Is someone directing you to do this, right now, while we're talking? And is the money going to an account you opened yourself, or one you were simply given?
None of the three questions require the teller to know anything about the specific scam in progress. They work because a legitimate transaction almost always has comfortable answers, and a scam in progress almost never does.
Where this gets uncomfortable, on purpose
Answering those questions honestly, mid-scam, is hard. A skilled scammer has usually already told the target what to say if the bank asks — a fake emergency requiring secrecy, a fake authority figure requiring compliance, a fake deadline requiring speed. Fleming's own framing is the tell: the story is the weapon, not the wire itself.
That's also the honest limit of what three questions can do. A bank employee asking them is a speed bump, not a wall. It works often. It does not work always.
What This Means for You
If you're sending a large wire — a home sale, an inheritance, help for a family member: expect your bank to slow down and ask questions that might feel intrusive or even insulting. They're not accusing you of anything. They're running the same three-question check that catches scams that look, on paper, exactly like your legitimate transaction. Answering plainly and completely is the fastest way through it.
If you're helping an older parent or relative with a wire transfer: the FBI's own data says business email compromise schemes are built to intercept exactly the kind of communication a title company or closing attorney would normally send. Confirming wiring instructions by phone, using a number you already had — not one from the email with the instructions — is the practical safeguard behind the bank's questions.
Sources
- ABA Banking Journal, "ABA Fraudcast: Defending Customers from Wire Fraud" — July 1, 2026
- FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, "Elder Fraud"
- HousingWire, "FBI: Seniors Lost $7.75B to Cybercrime in 2025 — a 59% Jump" — April 13, 2026
Disclaimer: This article is news and general information only, not financial or legal advice. Figures cited come from FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center reporting and are current as of publication.